

## ΑΙΔΩΣ IN EURIPIDES' *HIPPOLYTOS* 373-430: REVIEW AND REINTERPRETATION\*

Τὰ χρήστ' ἐπιστάμεσθα καὶ γινώσκομεν,  
οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν δ', οἱ μὲν ἀργίας ὄπο,  
οἱ δ' ἡδονὴν προθέεντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ  
ἄλλην τιν'· εἰσὶ δ' ἡδοναὶ πολλαὶ βίου,  
μακρὰ τε λέσχαι καὶ σχολή, τερπνὸν κακόν,  
αἰδῶς τε· δισσαὶ δ' εἰσὶν, ἡ μὲν οὐ κακὴ,  
ἡ δ' ἀχθος οἴκων· εἰ δ' ὁ καιρὸς ἦν σαφής,  
οὐκ ἂν δὴ ἦσθην ταῦτ' ἔχοντε γράμματα.<sup>1</sup>

LINES 380-7 have been much discussed, sometimes in isolation, without due regard for context in speech, scene, and play; and sometimes with regard primarily to the history of ideas, or of Greek moral values. Phaidra states that virtue may be subverted, despite knowledge, by pleasure, of which αἰδῶς—dual, harmless and harmful—is an instance. A notorious problem of interpretation centres on the related questions of how αἰδῶς, shame can be listed among ἡδοναί, pleasures; and of what is meant by dual αἰδῶς. The interpretation here advanced is bold, but in essence simple: in this context, αἰδῶς is a euphemistic metonymy for ἔρωσ, which is harmless and pleasurable in its proper place (allied with sexual σωφροσύνη), but potentially troublesome or painful (bringing sexual αἰσχύνη).

There is no reason to suspect textual corruption: it makes no difference to the central problem if we read ξ for τὰ in 380 (omitting δ' in 381) or προσθέεντες for προθέεντες in 382 (see Diggle's *OCT* and Barrett 433); there is no justification for supposing the text is lacunose; or for resorting to transposition, excision, or such emendation as ἄλλην τιν' ἄλλος· εἰσὶ δὲ φθοραὶ βίου in 383 (Gomperz). The syntax is not problematical, and the word order is unremarkable. As is generally conceded, the natural sequence of thought is as follows: We may recognise, yet fail to carry out, τὰ χρηστά. Some fail through ἀργία. Others fail through putting some other ἡδονή before τὸ καλόν. There are many ἡδοναί in life. There are μακρὰ τε λέσχαι καὶ σχολή...αἰδῶς τε...dual, one harmless, the other troublesome to

\* For a general treatment of this passage, see my contribution 'Tragic love, comic sex?' A. H. Sommerstein et al. (ed.) *Tragedy, comedy and the polis* (Bari 1993). Earlier versions were presented at seminars in University of Glasgow, University of St. Andrews and University of Washington, Seattle. I am grateful to those who participated in discussion on these occasions; and especially to Professor A. H. Sommerstein for the opportunity to present a dual discussion of dual *aidos*. I have profited from the trenchant comments of an anonymous *JHS* referee, and am greatly indebted to Douglas Cairns, who has given generous help on many points both of substance and of detail.

<sup>1</sup> Quotations from Euripides are from *OCT*: Diggle i and ii, Murray iii. The following works are cited by author's name alone: W.S. Barrett, *Euripides: Hippolytos*, ed. (Oxford 1964); D. Claus, 'Phaedra and the Socratic paradox', *YCS* xxii (1972) 223-38; D.J. Conacher, *Euripidean drama: myth, theme and structure*, (Toronto 1967); E.R. Dodds, 'The αἰδῶς of Phaedra and the meaning of the *Hippolytos*', *CR* xxxix (1925) 102-4; T.H. Irwin, 'Euripides and Socrates', *CPh* lxxviii (1983) 183-97; D. Kovacs, 'Shame, pleasure and honor in Phaedra's great speech (Euripides' *Hippolytos* 375-87)', *AJP* ci (1980) 287-303; D.B. Lombard, 'Aspects of αἰδῶς in Euripides', *AC* xxviii (1985) 5-12; C.A.E. Luschnig, *Time holds the mirror. A study of knowledge in Euripides' Hippolytos, Mnemosyne* Suppl. cii (1988); B. Manuwald, 'Phaidras tragischer Irrtum: zur Rede Phaidras in Euripides' *Hippolytos* (vv 373-430)', *RhM* cxxii (1979) 134-48; A.N. Michelini, *Euripides and the tragic tradition* (Madison 1987); J. Moline, 'Euripides, Socrates and virtue', *Hermes* ciii (1975) 45-67; C.P. Segal, 'Shame and purity in Euripides' *Hippolytos*', *Hermes* xcvi (1970) 278-99; B. Snell, *Scenes from Greek drama* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964); F. Solmsen, "'Bad shame" and related problems in Phaedra's speech (Euripides *Hippolytos* 380-388)', *Hermes* ci (1973) 420-5; C.W. Willink, 'Some problems of text and interpretation in *Hippolytos*', *CQ* xviii (1968) 11-43; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, 'Hippolytos: a study in causation', *Euripide, Entretiens de la Fondation Hardt* vi (Geneva 1960) 169-98.

households. But, because of the αἰδώς problem, the natural sequence of thought has often been disregarded, and such attempts to misconstrue must first be addressed. To do so, we now look separately at the syntax of 382-3, 383-5, 385-6. After these preliminaries, we turn to consideration of the structure and purpose of the speech as a whole, to its dramatic context, and—through sequential analysis of the content of 380-7 (380-3, 383-4, 385-6, 386-7)—to the case for reinterpretation of dual αἰδώς.

Lines 382-3 are above interpreted ‘choosing some other pleasure (*sc.* than ἀργία) rather than τὸ καλόν (*sc.* not a pleasure)’. Two alternative explanations have been put forward. (a) ‘Having preferred, instead of the good, something else, namely some pleasure’. Barrett, while admitting that ‘she exemplifies the temptations that can conflict with one’s sense of duty and prevent one from doing what one knows to be right’, rules out the translation ‘some other pleasure’ on the grounds that ‘ἀργία is not a pleasure’; and treats this as an example of the usage, especially common in Homer, where ἄλλος means ‘besides’, ‘as well’. Word order tells strongly against this interpretation (*cf.* Claus 228); and it is hard to justify ruling out ἀργία ‘inactivity’ as a pleasure, while admitting σχολή ‘leisure’ as one immediately afterwards.

(b) ‘Having preferred, not the good, but some other pleasure.’ Willink proposes this interpretation on the grounds that ‘the identification of “good” and “pleasant” was a familiar sophisticated theme’ (Willink 14). Claus follows in construction and refines in sense: ‘she is giving us a simple version of the attempt by late-fifth-century thinkers to define ἡδονή and to distinguish between true and false pleasure, as attested for example in Democritus (B207: ἡδονὴν οὐ πᾶσαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ αἰρεῖσθαι χρέων)’ (Claus 231). Kovacs, following Willink and Claus, defends at length both construction and interpretation. On construction, he argues that ‘ἄλλος ἀντί is an idiomatic variation for ἄλλος ἢ...and the separation of ἄλλην from its noun in our passage serves to bracket ἀντί τοῦ καλοῦ so as to strengthen the connection...’ and suggests that ‘...readers unconsciously render ἀντί as “in preference to”, “before” perhaps under the influence of the Latin *ante*’ (Kovacs 293, 294 n.13). This is to disregard the common idiom expressing the idea of ‘good’ ἀντί ‘bad’: see, to cite Euripidean instances, *Hel.* 1029 οὔποτε κεκλήση δυσσεβῆς ἀντ’ εὐσεβοῦς, *HF* 856, ἐς τὸ λφον ἐμβιβάζω σ’ ἵχνος ἀντί τοῦ κακοῦ, *IA* 488 τὸ κακὸν ἀντί τὰγαθοῦ.

In sense, the interpretation depends on the view that ‘For Phaedra, the honorable life is not incompatible with pleasure, for honor is itself a pleasure’ and that ‘her discussion of pleasure is Greek, not Kantian, and allows for pleasure in virtuous conduct...’ (Kovacs 294, 300). Much is made of an alleged difference between supposed Greek views of pleasure (based on the fragment of Demokritos quoted above) and supposed modern views (based on Kantian deontology). Out of context, it is of course true that right action may sometimes give pleasure (to post-Kantians as well as Greeks); but it is obvious that pleasure and duty often conflict (for Greeks as well as post-Kantians). In context, it is clear that Phaedra is concerned not with relative pleasures but absolute, with pleasure versus τὰ χρηστὰ and τὸ καλόν.

Lines 383-5 are above interpreted: following the instance of ἀργία (*sc.* ἡδονή impeding some people from accomplishing τὰ χρηστὰ) further examples of ἡδοναί (*sc.* potentially preferable to τὸ καλόν) are given; there are many pleasures in life—long talks, leisure and αἰδώς. Commonly, the expression μάκραι τε λέσχαι καὶ σχολή is regarded as a hendiadys, with αἰδώς then regarded as a second, not a third, element. But the position and emphasis of αἰδώς strongly indicate that it is the culminating and emphatic element in a triad (*cf.* *Ba.* 1046-7 Πενθεύς τε κάγω.../ξένος θ’). A more serious misinterpretation is to deny that αἰδώς is a pleasure at all. Barrett comments ‘...taken literally, Phaedra is calling αἰδώς a pleasure, which it is not...But she must not be taken literally: she adds αἰδώς to her list as an example not of ἡδονή but of something προτεθὲν ἀντί τοῦ καλοῦ; she has (and so have the audience) forgotten the grammatical construction of the earlier parts of the list...’ (Barrett 230). This breathtaking disregard of grammar and syntax was properly castigated by reviewers (*cf.* Segal 286 n. 4).

Lines 385-6 as above interpreted can be paraphrased: 'αἰδώς is dual in character, good and bad'. (The translation 'dual' is preferable to 'double', 'twofold' or 'of two sorts', as it better conveys the sense of δισσαί taken up by δὺ...two lines later.) Here, a serious misunderstanding, first advanced by Willink, has, despite rebuttal by Segal (299, addendum) and general disregard by others, been followed by Claus and recently given a determined airing by Kovacs. Following on the interpretation of ἡδονήν...ἄλλην τιν' (discussed above), they suggest that δισσαί δ' εἰσὶν refers not to αἰδώς, but to ἡδοναί. Regrettably, Kovacs is followed now, with slight modification, by Luschnig: 'With Kovacs...I think it best to take *dissai* as referring to *hedonai* (and therefore also to each of the pleasures Phaedra lists); but I differ with Kovacs' explanation of lines 384-5 as a list of pleasures, harmful and harmless together...' (Luschnig 42 n. 18). The interpretation is dismissed briefly by Diggle, reviewing Kovacs, *The heroic muse. Studies in the Hippolytus and Hecuba of Euripides*, *AJP Monogr. in Class. Philol.* ii (1987): '...he goes astray at 380 ff. (he refers δισσαί to ἡδοναί)' (*AJP* cx [1989] 361). Kovacs' arguments are advanced with confidence: 'It should now be necessary for those who disagree with this reinterpretation to make a detailed reply' (Kovacs 300). A simple general reply may be made: even if Willink, Claus, and Kovacs are right, that the grammar imperatively demands that δισσαί be taken strictly with the plural subject ἡδοναί, and not be understood to refer to αἰδώς immediately preceding, we may still suppose the reference to be to the pleasures of αἰδώς by construing δισσαί δ' εἰσὶν [αἰδούς] ἡδοναί. And, even if this is resisted, the duality may refer to the specific pleasures listed, rather than to pleasures in general. Thus, even if, in the absence of a change of subject, δισσαί is to be referred to ἡδοναί, the concept of αἰδώς will still be ambivalent. More specifically, Kovacs' arguments (294-5) may be briefly addressed. (a) 'The preceding lines about "some pleasure other than *to kalon*" make it clear that pleasure is a problematical notion...' This is circular argument: we need not follow Willink and Claus in their interpretation, which in context is, as noted above, highly implausible. (b) 'The list of pleasures Phaedra gives is introduced by the phrase "Life's pleasures are many (πολλά)" and it is natural to resume after the list with "But they are of two different kinds (δισσαί)". But we need not suppose that Phaedra is resuming after the list; rather that she is completing it and elaborating on the culminating and most important item. (c) 'While it is true that δισσαί in poetic language sometimes means little more than "two", its root meaning is "of two sorts"... We might suppose that the basic meaning would be retained...when the adjective is used predicatively'. On most interpretations of the double αἰδώς, including that advanced here, it makes little difference if δισσαί is taken literally; but there is some reason to translate 'two', or 'dual', rather than 'twofold' in this passage, as 387 δὺ, with dual number in the verb, clearly takes up 385 δισσαί. And Euripides' fondness for expressions of duality is a well-known stylistic tic (see the Allen-Italie *Concordance* s.v. δίδυμος, διπλοῦς, δίπτυχος as well as δισός), and is indeed so characteristic that it is parodied by Aristophanes (*fr.* 558 Kock = 570 Kassel & Austin). We may note, in this play, 258-9 ὑπὲρ δισῶν μίαν ὠδίνειν/ ψυχὴν, 928-9 δισσᾶς...φωναίς.../ τὴν μὲν δικαίαν τὴν δ' ὅπως ἐτύγχανεν, 1161 δισσᾶς...ἄστρυγέτονας πόλεις, 1344-5 δίδυμον.../ πένθος. (d) 'The usual translation "This last is of two sorts"...imports an epanaphoric expression into a Greek text which does not have it and uses singular to represent the Greek plural'. But we must examine the Greek text for itself, not as (loosely) translated. This point does not differ substantially from the next. (e) '...except for the mistaken scholium on this very passage, *aidos* has no plural...' But to impute a solecism to a scholiast is hazardous (*cf.* Manuwald 138). Although the form proposed is incorrect, it does not preclude a correct plural form: we may compare the existence of plurals of ἀνδρεία (*Pl. Lg.* 922a), σωφροσύνη (*Hom. Od.* xxiii 30), σοφία (*Ar. Ra.* 676), conveying instances of these qualities. And, if Willink-Claus-Kovacs were right, we should need plural expressions for the singular 385-6 ἢ μὲν...ἢ δ': *cf.* 928-9, quoted above. Kovacs then argues that 'Lines 384-85...are a list not of harmful pleasures, but of harmful and harmless pleasures together...' He is forced, however, to admit that '...even as a list of good and bad pleasures

[this] is not a very representative collection...’ (Kovacs 298) and because of the character of the items on the list and their number he postulates ‘reluctantly’ a lacuna. But four pleasures are in fact listed (ἀργία, μακροῖ λῆσχαί, σχολή, αἰδώς). Kovacs reduces these to two by discounting the first and conflating the next two by supposing hendiadys. The character of the items, the coherence of the list, and its conformity with Greek ideas on pleasure are further discussed below.

We now consider structure and purpose. The speech is commonly described as ‘great’ or ‘central’, but there is little agreement as to its general tenor. It is variously viewed as a confession of moral guilt (with the bad αἰδώς often elevated to the status of tragic error), or similarly as an admission of failure; or conversely as self-justification and a bid for sympathy.

It is important to note that the speech is apologetic in character: Phaidra claims that, though subject to strong erotic compulsion, she has resisted; she has not committed, and will die rather than commit, adultery. In format, the overt content of this quasi-forensic apologia is schematically arranged and rhetorically argued. The arrangement is standard: introduction, general, yet germane to Phaidra’s situation (15 lines: 373-87); narration of her own case (15 lines, introduced by οὖν: 388-402); discussion of its implications (23 lines, introduced by γάρ: 403-25); and short peroration (5 lines: 426-30). (Or perhaps we might consider discussion to end at 418, giving 16 lines, with a peroration then of 12.) The substance of the speech may be briefly summed up: in introduction, Phaidra argues that conscious moral lapse is possible, giving pleasure as a reason for this and αἰδώς as an example of pleasure; in narrative, she tells of her attempts to cope with her passion (i.e. not to give way to pleasure, and to avoid moral lapse); in discussion, she expresses her agreement with the general disapprobation for adulterous women, and her wish to dissociate herself from grounds for it; in conclusion she remarks that time will tell.

There are forensic touches in language and content as well as in arrangement (and we may note legal terms earlier in the episode, 286 ξυμμαρτυρηῖς, 296 μηνυθῆ, 298 ἐλέγχειν): the address to the chorus, as if to a jury (373 paradoxically women of Troizen, for the customary men of Athens), with subsequent reminders of their presence as addressees (391, 419); the use of technical or semi-technical legal terms (375, ἄλλως extraneous to this case; 404, μάρτυρας witnesses; 420, ἄλω be caught); and the use of locutions appropriate in litigation (379, ‘look at it this way’; 388-90, argument from probability; 402, claim that no-one would dissent; 395-7, professed distrust of the medium of speech; 407, 413, distancing of the speaker from wrongdoers). And the rhetorical device of the triad is prominent: pleasures are λῆσχαί, σχολή, αἰδώς and Phaidra’s recourse was to cover up, to conquer, to die. There are elements too of deliberative techniques, as Phaidra explains her dilemma and her resolve; perhaps even of epideictic in 421-3, the faintly incongruous, almost jingoistic, terms of patriotic eulogy.

The speech is internally well crafted, with repetitions of significant elements at beginning and end. The thrust of her general consideration is stated at 376 ἦ διέφθαρται βίος: the verb is then repeated at 389, with reference to her own claim to constancy of purpose, and the noun at 383 and 426. That γνώμη is not proof against moral lapse is stated initially; yet ironically in conclusion Phaidra again mentions the view that good judgment may serve as protection (426-7: here βίω is taken to mean *in* life, not as Barrett *with* life). It is the first and last time that Phaidra articulates her sentiments in the form of a rhesis. Words of reflection and especially of moral awareness are prominent (376, 377, 378, 380, 388, 390, 391, 392, 396, 399, 401, 402, 406, 427). Emotional language is relatively absent (413). Moral terms pervade the speech, and social terms are relatively absent (405 δυσκλεῖα, 423 εὐκλεεῖς). For the most part, the moral terms are remarkably general (376, 378, 380, 382, 384, 385, 389, 393, 397, 398, 403-4, 410, 411, 412, 414, 425, 428); but as the speech proceeds it becomes evident that these general words have a very specific reference. The speech is about adultery, and especially the adultery of wives. It is clearly to this specific situation that the general terms, good and bad, of 403-4

and 411-2 refer. And at 408 and 420, the verb αἰσχύνειν is used clearly of adultery. Similarly, 413 σῶφρων and 399 σῶφρονεῖν are used of marital fidelity.

We turn now to dramatic context. The speech deploys ideas and terminology present in the earlier part of the play, and adumbrates what is to come. Phaidra's distress is obliquely expressed in the lyric utterances following her first entry, in terms similar to those of the subsequent direct expression in rhesis. In the stanza 239-49 she initially laments the loss of her good judgment, then expresses feelings of shame (in terms both of αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη) and concludes τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμην ὀδυνᾷ, / τὸ δὲ μαινόμενον κακόν· ἀλλὰ κρατεῖ / μὴ γινώσκοντ' ἀπολέσθαι: i.e. it is painful to keep one's judgment upright; madness (*sc.* of *eros*) is reprehensible; it is best if one cannot maintain judgment to die. This short stanza encapsulates the content of the long rhesis: in particular, the last lines are an emotional expression of the view that it is best to die if one cannot maintain one's judgment (γνώμη, γινώσκειν, *cf.* 377, 380, 391, 427) in the struggle between painful rectitude (ὀδυνᾷ corollary with 383 ἡδοναί) and the madness of passion. The Nurse's rejoinder, 250-66, commenting on the undesirability of an excess of emotion, while referring to her own close relationship with Phaidra, may imply also Phaidra's overwhelming desire for Hippolytos. The Nurse's speech, 284-310, employs locutions later employed by Phaidra: 290 γνώμης ὀδόν, repeated 391; 300 δεῦρ' ἄθρησον, echoed 379; 305-6 betrayal of children, repeated 421. In the ensuing stichomythia, where Phaidra's secret is revealed, we may note the stress on value terms of morality (327, 328, 330, 331) and honour (329, 332); the idea of life and death, literally (314) or in terms of life worth living (341); Phaidra's wish not to be seen wronging Theseus (321, *cf.* 420, 430) and especially the designation of erotic passion as ἡδιστον...ταῦτὸν ἀλγεινὸν θ' ἕμα (348, *cf.* the double αἰδώς). The Nurse then comments that οἱ σῶφρονες γὰρ, οὐχ ἐκόντες ἀλλ' ὄμως, / κακῶν ἐρώσι (358-9, *cf.* 377-83); and the concluding line is that Aphrodite has destroyed τήνδε κάμῃ καὶ δόμους (361, *cf.* 386 ἄχθος οἴκων and 813).

In the next scene, Phaidra capitulates to the nurse's persuasion, and there are constant reminders of her previous words. Some of these are arguably simple expressions of the theme of secret adultery and intrigue (466 λανθάνειν recalling 403); but others are more direct. The stress on sensual pleasure continues in 495 εὐνής οὐνεχ' ἡδονῆς τε σῆς and the central concern with opposition between pleasure and duty in 488-9 οὐ γὰρ τι τοῖσιν ὡσὶ τερπνὰ χρῆ λέγειν / ἀλλ' ἐξ ὄτου τις εὐκλεῆς γενήσεται. Most tellingly, Phaidra's claim that she was unlikely to be deflected from her moral path by a φάρμακον is ironically countered by her acceptance of the Nurse's intervention with precisely that (479, repeated 516). The following stasimon on the subject of Eros distinguishes between good sexual relations (526-7 εἰσάγων γλυκεῖαν / ψυχᾷ χάριν, *cf.* 508, 515) and bad, immoderate, sexual passion (528, 529 σὺν κακῷ and ἄρρυθμος), with a series of exempla of the latter (535-64). This is a clear contextual commentary on Phaidra's hapless desire, and amplifies the Nurse's comment 443 Κύπρις γὰρ οὐ φορητόν, ἦν πολλῆ ῥύη.

Later in the play too Phaidra's helpless stance is recalled. In the final exchange between Phaidra and the Nurse, the latter recognizes the failure of her schemes, with the word φάρμακα (699) and the verb used by Phaidra at 685 προῦνοησάμην recalls 399. Her death is defeat by a bitter *eros* (727, *cf.* 401). It is described by the chorus 771-5 δαίμονα στυγρὸν καταιδεσθεῖσα, τάν τ' εὐδοξὸν ἀνθαρουμένα φήμαν, ἀπαλλάσ/σουσά τ' ἀλγεινὸν φρενῶν ἔρωτα. The three reasons given for her suicide are interconnected: shame at her predicament, preservation of her reputation, and escape from her painful *eros*. And, significantly, Artemis summarises the action in words which evoke Phaidra's own expressions for the struggle between judgment and passion, and subversion of the will 1304-5 γνώμη δὲ νικᾶν τὴν Κύπριν πειρωμένη / τρόφου διώλετ' οὐχ ἐκούσα μηχαναίς.

We proceed now to sequential analysis of the content of the speech. Lines 380-3 are of great interest as a statement on moral choice. Snell's view (following Barthold, *comm.* Berlin 1880) that Euripides intended a direct polemical response to the Sokratic equation of virtue with knowledge,

and that this is the first contemporary evidence for the teaching of Sokrates, has been vigorously contested. Claus expresses scepticism on the basis that ‘Phaedra equates morality with preserving a reputation for chastity...’ and ‘her conception of morality [is] primarily concern for εὐκλεία’: this means that ‘her statement is so rooted in a non-Socratic conception of morality and the self that Sokrates cannot reasonably be seen as its inspiration’ (Claus 231, 234, 235). Moline examines the evidence for the historical Sokrates, discusses the contradictory standpoints of Euripides and argues that, considering the nature of polemic, firm conclusions are impossible. A more positive conclusion on Sokratic content is reached by Irwin, noting that Euripides’ characters embody a view of human motivation that is opposed to the central paradox of Sokrates’ propositions.

‘Polemic’ is too strong a word, but Euripides’ awareness of contemporary intellectual debate is evident; and it is argued below that some ideas of Antiphon, Demokritos, Prodikos and Protagoras, as well as of Sokrates, may be traced in this extraordinarily dense speech. In this play of 428 BC, as in *Medeia* of 431, Euripides represents characters who fail to follow courses of action they recognise intellectually to be right or good (whether for them personally or in more absolute terms), because their will is overcome by other forces (whether from within themselves or from outside). This applies not only to Phaedra but also to Theseus, who (like *Medeia*) is overcome by anger, being advised by the chorus 900-1 ὀργῆς δ’ ἔξανεις κακῆς.../. . τὸ λῦστον...βούλευσαι (cf. 1087, 1124) and who (like Phaedra) feels shamed by his passions (1291 αἰσχυνθεῖς and 1332 αἰσχύνῃ). For similar sentiments in *Medeia*, see 1077-9 νικῶμαι κακοῖς/ καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἶα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά/ θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἔμων βουλευμάτων (but for possible spuriousness, see Diggle *apparatus*) and for later plays see *Chrysis* fr. 840 and 841 Nauck λέληθεν οὐδὲν τῶνδὲ μ’ ὦν σὺ νουθετεῖς/ γνώμην δ’ ἔχοντά μ’ ἢ φύσις βιάζεται and, the reply, αἰαῖ, τόδ’ ἤδη θεῖον ἀνθρώποις κακόν./ ὅταν τις εἰδῆ τὰγαθόν, χρήται δὲ μή and also *Antiope* fr. 220 Nauck = XXV Kambitsis πολλοὶ δὲ θνητῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν κακόν./ γνώμη φρονούντες οὐ θέλουσ’ ὑπηρετεῖν/ ψυχῇ τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς φίλων νικῶμενοι. (Later thinkers— cf. Plu. *Mor.* 446a—made distinctions between ‘incontinence’ and ‘intemperance’; but, as Irwin notes, Euripidean passages were cited in support of both sides in this philosophical argument.)

These dramatic characters talk and behave in the same way as Sokrates’ ordinary people, described as swayed by emotions (in which pleasure and *eros* are included) in Plato’s *Protagoras*: *Prt.* 352b δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρόν οὐδ’ ἡγεμονικόν οὐδ’ ἀρχικόν εἶναι...ἀλλ’ ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἀρχεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον. Whereas to the Platonic Sokrates virtue is inextricably linked with knowledge and specifically with self-knowledge (as in *Protagoras* of virtues, viewed as a unity of parts, with σωφροσύνη a component; and in *Charmides* specifically of σωφροσύνη, which is thus both self-control and self-knowledge), to the Euripidean characters, as to the *hoi polloi* of *Prt.* 352b, there is no such necessary link. Virtuous action may be precluded by, for instance, desire for pleasure. Phaedra discounts Sokratic ideas about vice as ignorance, making a straightforward contrast between virtue and pleasure (i.e. between successfully exercising conscious reason or will to do what is right, and succumbing to wrongful pleasure).

Distinctions between degrees of morality and types of good conduct are secondary to this main concern. To the contrast between virtue and pleasure, a contrast between good and bad pleasure is subsequently added. The point here is not a Demokritean distinction between pleasures of the mind and pleasures of the body. Demokritos’ statement that there are good pleasures as well as bad, and that the former should be preferred (B207; see Claus and Kovacs for discussion, based rather narrowly on this fragment, of true and false pleasure) is irrelevant: he describes the good as the pleasures of the ψυχῇ, not ephemeral ‘mortal’ pleasures (A37, A167, B189). Phaedra’s distinction is not of this broad qualitative kind, but is more narrowly focussed, with a quantitative as well as qualitative element. Pleasure, always potentially ‘bad’, and commonly opposed to virtue, is peculiarly so in that excessive or inappropriate pleasure (harmful over-indulgence or misplaced

indulgence in pleasures which are in themselves harmless) is thoroughly bad: see below on 386-7.

The common conjunction of αἰδώς with σωφροσύνη and virtue, as opposed to pleasure, underlies much of the modern perplexity over the passage: commentators are exercised as to how αἰδώς can be bad, and a pleasure. The complexities of αἰδώς are explored below; our present concern is with the popular opposition between (sensual) pleasure and (rational) virtue. Pleasures are regularly regarded as temptations, to be overcome before one is 'good'; and as such are 'bad'. It is a commonplace that excessive indulgence in pleasures is reprehensible; and self-control, a concept closely linked with αἰδώς, is regularly viewed as mastery over pleasures and desires. Among many Platonic passages which might be cited, these are very explicit: *Smp.* 196a σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν and *Gorg.* 491d (presented as nothing sophisticated, ποικίλον, but the view of the masses, οἱ πολλοί) ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα...σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Other writers concur in this general view: see Arist. *EN* 1117b-11128b on σωφροσύνη with reference to food, drink and sex, and Isoc. i 21 on ἐγκράτεια as mastery of gain, anger, pleasure and pain.

To Antiphon, as here in Euripides, pleasure and virtue are at variance. (See W. K. C. Guthrie, *A history of Greek philosophy* iii [Cambridge 1969] 258-9 for discussion of Antiphon in relation to this passage.) One must consciously overcome the base to become σῶφρων, and 'mastery of self' is mastery of desires (DK ii 87 B58 and 59). Phaidra's strategy to overcome her desires, τῷ σωφρονεῖν νικῶσα Κύπριν κρατῆσαι (cf. 426-7 ἀμιλλᾶσθαι, 727 πικροῦ δ' ἔρωτος ἡσσηθήσομαι) recalls these terms. For similar expressions of such moral struggles, cf. also *Andr.* 631 ἡσσω Κύπριδος, fr. 187.6, ἡδονῆς ἡσσω, fr. 282.5 νηδύος ἡσσω and for other authors *Lys.* xxi 19 ὕψ' ἡδονῆς ἡττηθῆναι, Th. iii 38.7 ἡδονῆ ἡσώμενοι.

The choice of Herakles, as told, according to Xenophon, by Prodikos, was overtly allegorical and didactic in its thrust (Prodikos DK ii 84 B2 = X. *Mem.* ii 1.21-34), and epitomised such conflicts, expressed in sexual terms, between virtuous abstinence, bringing credit, praise and happiness after short-term pain, against reprehensible self-indulgence, bringing short-term but meretricious pleasure. Herakles had a choice in life (βίος) between virtue and vice (ἀρετὴ and κακία) represented as a choice between two women, one of modest face and chaste demeanour (τὰ...ἄμματα αἰδοῖ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα σωφροσύνη) and the other, of seductive garb and appearance, offering a path of great pleasure (τὴν ἡδίστην ὁδὸν) and indulgence of all sensual delights (τερπνά).

A similarly allegorical and dramatically effective presentation of this conflict, much favoured by Euripides, and invariably tied thematically to the ruinous fall of Troy, is the myth of the judgment of Paris. (See T. C. W. Stinton, *Euripides and the judgment of Paris*, *JHS* suppl. paper xi [1965] 63, for the suggestion that the significance is 'that man is helpless against the designs of the gods, and that the glittering prizes they offer, which he cannot refuse, may exalt him for a time to their level, but in the end destroy him'.) According to Athenaios, this was represented by Sophokles as a choice between Aphrodite as sensuous Pleasure and Athena as ascetic Virtue; with disorder consequent on Aphrodite's victory. (Athen. xv 687c Σοφοκλέης...τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην ἠδονὴν τινα οὖσαν δαίμονα μύρω τε ἀλειφομένην παράγει καὶ κατοπριζομένην, τὴν δὲ Ἀθηνᾶν Φρόνησιν οὖσαν καὶ Νοῦν ἔτι δ' Ἀρετὴν, ἐλαίῳ χρισμένην καὶ γυμναζομένην and, expressing approval of such presentation, xii 510c πάντα συνεταράχθη).

The Greek ambiguity over value terms, with their relative and shifting sense, which Euripides, like Plato, skilfully exploits, is a further obstacle to modern exegesis of the passage. Morality, success and pleasure are all 'good' and not readily linguistically differentiated; and so debate on pleasure is part of debate on virtue and honour, or on the quest for the 'good' life, variously viewed as one of good conduct, good reputation or good times. Thus, the choral rejoinder to Phaidra's speech is that τὸ σῶφρον is καλόν and brings δόξαν ἐσθλήν (431-2). The Nurse's words of persuasion are 487 καλοὶ λίαν λόγοι yet 499 αἰσχίστους λόγους and 500 αἰσχρ' ἄλλ' ἀμείνω τῶν καλῶν, 503-5 spoken εὖ and καλῶς yet recognized to be αἰσχρᾶ. This nexus of

value terms is nowhere more clearly seen than in Plato's *Philebos*. In that dialogue, there are exponents of the good life in terms of the competing values pleasure, reason and reputation; but the main opposition is between the advocates of the first two, ἡδονή and φρόνησις (19c-d). In the exploration of hedonism different types and degrees of pleasures are recognized, as they were by Demokritos (12c-d ἡδεσθαι μὲν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον, ἡδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονούντα αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν).

The argument that Phaidra is concerned only with the appearance of virtue, not with the reality, is often advanced, and owes something to the influence of Wilamowitz.<sup>2</sup> Certainly, much is made of her εὐκλεία and τιμή, both by herself and other characters: Aphrodite introduces her in such terms, 47; and Phaidra herself dwells on them *in extremis*. However, although she seems to hint that undetected adultery might be acceptable (404, 430, *cf.* 321), her rational view is that both desire and act are reprehensible (405, 413); while to the Nurse, *così fan tutti e tutte*, and relative goodness is good enough (471-2). Preservation of her reputation plays a part in Phaidra's motivation, but a subordinate part; similarly at 771-5 reputation is part, but only part, of the choral verdict.

In 383-4, Phaidra expatiates on the theme of pleasures. Most critics regard the pleasures first listed—inactivity, conversation, leisure—as appropriate to Phaidra's situation, 'the temptations of her own cloistered life' (Barrett), though a few dispute this, regarding the entire disquisition as general in character (e.g. Solmsen 420-1). It may be argued that they, like αἰδώς, are ambivalent: λέσχη is conversation (Hdt. ix 71), but also scandal or gossip (*IA* 1001 λέσχας πονηράς); ἀργία is rest, leisure (*Pl. Lg.* 761a) but also culpable inactivity (*HF* 592) of a type actually punishable by law (*D.* lvii 32). Furthermore, these pleasures, implying time on one's hands and boredom (384 μακράι, and *cf.* the same adjective 375) are precisely those conventionally seen as available to and undesirable for wives (*cf.* the strictures *Andr.* 943-53 and indeed *Hipp.* 645-50), implying a dangerous degree of freedom and especially of sexual freedom. They are not 'an innocent-sounding trio of female pleasures...' (Willink 14); and they are not a list of good and bad pleasures together (Kovacs).

It may be added that τερπνόν is the *mot juste* for sensual and especially sexual delight (*cf.* *E. Ba.* 774 οὐκ ἔστιν Κύπρις οὐδ' ἄλλο τερπνόν οὐδὲν ἄνθρωποις, *Supp.* 453-4 παρθενεύειν παῖδας...τερπνὰς τυράννοις ἡδονὰς, that διαφθεῖρειν is common in contexts of seduction (*Lys.* i 16, *E. Ba.* 318-9, and for the ambiguity *cf.* the double usage later in the play, *Hipp.* 1008 and 1436, metaphorically of Hippolytos' putative sexual corruption and literally of his death), and that ἡδονή itself is a common euphemism for sex (*cf.* *E. Ph.* 21, 338, *Supp.* 453-4; and the telling hendiadys 495 εὐνῆς οὐνεχ' ἡδονῆς τε σῆς, also the equation of Aphrodite with pleasure, Plato *Philebos* 12c and the recurrent presentation in sexual terms of the choices of Herakles and of Paris, discussed above). Phaidra's list of pleasures can now be seen to cohere. The earlier pleasures are to some degree ambiguous, and to some degree sensual, and they culminate in αἰδώς, explicitly said to be ambivalent, and here argued to be sexual. Phaidra begins her list of pleasures in general terms, leading up to sex, her prime concern. But just as she could not bring herself to name Hippolytos (352), she here stops short of naming sexual union.

Phaidra's list of pleasures has struck many critics as odd, and unrepresentative. However, its internal coherence, argued above, is matched by conformity with popular Greek views on pleasures and their limitations. Commonly, pleasures are seen as pleasures of the senses; and, as we saw above, self-control is seen as control over bodily pleasures. Plato regularly cites food, drink and sex as 'standard' pleasures (*Prt.* 353c, *Phd.* 64d, *R.* 329a; *cf.* Solmsen 424 n. 15). In conformity

<sup>2</sup> See W.M. Calder III, 'The riddle of Wilamowitz' Phaidrabild', *GRBS* xx (1979) 215-36; also D. Gilula, 'A consideration of Phaedra's εὐκλεία', *RSCC* vii (1981) 121-33, S. Kawashima, 'αἰδώς and εὐκλεία: another interpretation of Phaedra's long speech in the *Hippolytus*', *SIFC* iv (1986) 183-94 and *cf.* D.C. Braund, 'Artemis Eukleia and Euripides' *Hippolytus*', *JHS* c (1980) 184-5.



with this, Euripides elsewhere uses ἡδονή of, for men, food (*Ion* 1170), drink (*IT* 954) and sex (*Ph.* 21, 338); for women, gossip is added (*Ph.* 200).

The pleasures of Phaidra are in conformity also with Aristophanic evidence. That Euripides presented women as pleasure-seeking, shameless, lecherous, bibulous, faithless and gossiping is alleged by the characters in Aristophanes *Thesmophoriazousai* (see esp. 385-94, 426, 547, 490-501, 549). Phaidra epitomises these traits (497 Φαίδραν λοιδορεῖ, 546 Μελανίππας ποιῶν Φαίδρας τε, cf. also 550 and *Ra.* 1043, 1052). References to Phaidra are conventionally related to Euripides' lost first *Hippolytos*, not to the extant play; but clearly the name, like those of Melanippe and Stheneboia, had become a byword, and it is unlikely that the Aristophanic audiences had a clear and discriminating recollection of the differences between the two dramas.

Lines 385-6 present the greatest problem. Barrett (on 385-6) notes evidence for a traditional ambivalent perception of αἰδώς, citing three successive Hesiodic lines beginning with that word: αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρήμενον ἄνδρα κομίζει/ αἰδώς, ἢ τ' ἄνδρας μέγα σίνετα ἡδ' ὀνίνησιν/ αἰδώς τοι πρὸς ἀνολβίη θάρσος δὲ πρὸς ὄλβῳ (*WD* 317-9). The Hesiodic passage does not help directly with the interpretation of Euripidean αἰδώς, though the ensuing lines *WD* 327-9 are relevant to the interpretation of καιρός; see below. (On αἰδώς see M. L. West, *Hesiod Works and Days* [Oxford 1978] *ad. loc.*, 'Hesiod is not saying that there is a bad Aidos separate from the good...and that she looks after the needy, but that Aidos...is not good at looking after the needy'.) The very similar Homeric passages (*Od.* xvii 347, *Il.* xxiv 44) are equally unhelpful for our purposes. Priority is unclear; and it may be that both poets incorporate a traditional idea, keeping its traditional expression. What may be said with certainty, in the light especially of *WD* 318, is that αἰδώς is not always or necessarily a good thing for its possessor. Whilst concerned with bad αἰδώς in 317, and perhaps also 319, Hesiod clearly implies a duality in the middle line.

The Hesiodic passage is not the sole evidence for ambiguous or ambivalent αἰδώς. For the idea that αἰδώς is not always good, Barrett cites also a fragment of Euripides' *Erechtheus*: αἰδοῦς δὲ καὐτὸς δυσκρίτως ἔχω πέρι·/ καὶ δεῖ γὰρ αὐτῆς κᾶστιν αἶ κακὸν μέγα (365 Nauck = *Erechth.* fr. 56 Austin). This is not directly helpful either. The context may be simply *Erechtheus*' overcoming his scruples about sacrificing his daughter (so T. B. L. Webster, *The tragedies of Euripides* [London 1967] 128). Tantalizingly, it is in fragments—inevitably difficult, or even impossible, to interpret—that the idea of different kinds of αἰδώς, or of αἰδώς as a bad quality, recurs. We have the following two cases to add to Barrett's examples: κακὸν γὰρ αἰδώς, ἔνθα τὰναιδὲς κρατεῖ (*Trag. adesp.* 528 Nauck = 528 Kannicht & Snell), but this may mean little more than that evil often triumphs over good, or that it is no good having scruples when unscrupulousness rules; and αἰδώς ἀπώλεσ' αὐτὸν, ἐρρέτω, κακῆ/ πολλὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν δειλὸς ὢν ἐκτίσατο (*Trag. adesp.* 556 Nauck = 556 Kannicht & Snell), but this just corroborates the *Hippolytos* passage, to the effect that bad αἰδώς, whatever that is, is destructive. A further fragment αἰδοῦς ἀχαλκεῖτοισιν ἔζευκται πέδαις (Euripides 595 Nauck = *Peirithous* fr. 6, D.F. Sutton, *Two lost plays of Euripides* [New York 1987]) seems, in view of the context of Plutarch's citations, to refer to the ties and obligations of friendship. The Sophoklean lines αἰδώς γὰρ ἐν κακοῖσιν οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ/ ἢ γὰρ σιωπῇ τῶγκαλοῦντι σύμμαχος (*S. fr.* 928) are reminiscent of the Hesiodic passage.

Plutarch affords an early gloss on our passage: ὁ δ' εἰπὼν αἰδώς τε...οἴκων ἄρ' οὐ δηλὸς ἐστὶ συνησθημένος ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πολλάκις μὲν ἀκολουθοῦν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ συγκατακοσμούμενον, πολλάκις δὲ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ὀκνοῖς καὶ μελλήσσει καιροῦς καὶ πράγματα λυμαινόμενον (*Moralia* 448f.), paraphrased by Barrett, 'The man who said this had evidently observed this feeling in his own breast, often going the same way as reason and helping it to set things in order, but often going against reason and producing delays and hesitations that played havoc with his behaviour'. Barrett follows Plutarch, explaining: 'αἰδώς, which inhibits a man from self-assertion in face of the claims of others, is properly a virtue; but it can easily turn

into a diffidence or indecisiveness which...becomes a vice'. This is all very well, but it seems to have little connection either with pleasure, or with the preceding elements in Phaidra's list.

Dodds, in a brief but influential article, argues that the good αἰδώς is internal (shame, impulse to inward morality), the bad αἰδώς external (respect, attention to outward conventions); he takes the two to be illustrated by 244 αἰδοῦμεθα γὰρ τὰ λελεγμένα μοι, and 335 δώσω σέβας γὰρ χειρὸς αἰδοῦμαι τὸ σόν. Unlike Barrett, and many since, Dodds rightly follows the momentum of the Greek: Phaidra is 'speaking of αἰδώς as a dangerous ἡδονή, as a *temptation*, like long gossiping and idleness' (Dodds 103); but like Barrett he seems to demand a high degree of analytical attention from the theatrical audience. It is hard to believe that the audience would recall, on cue, the two earlier lines, which have no particular emphasis in context.

Dodds' views have been repeated in modified or expanded form by many others, and are perhaps closest to a canonical interpretation of the passage. So, briefly, H. Lloyd-Jones regards the bad quality as 'paying too much respect, out of consideration for other people, to the advice they give' (*The Justice of Zeus* [Berkeley and Los Angeles 1971] 147-8). Winnington-Ingram distinguishes the motivation of Phaidra from that of Hippolytos, while Segal, starting from a consideration of ἀγνός and ἀγνεύειν, finds a series of contrasts between the two main characters and interprets the double αἰδώς 'in terms of the two kinds of "purity"...or, more broadly, in terms of that division between public and private, social *nomoi* and the individual, which...divides Hippolytus from Phaedra' (Segal 283). Such parallelisms, particularly with regard to σωφροσύνη and αἰδώς, are of the utmost significance, and have been traced by many critics.<sup>3</sup> As to pleasure, Segal finds that '...*aidos* here appears as a *social* pleasure...to gain the approval of her peers...by doing what society expects' (Segal 285; Solmsen 424 n. 14 wonders if this would not be εὐκλεία). And, most recently, Lombard (not addressing this passage in detail, but treating *Hippolytos* with other Euripidean plays) argues for Euripidean polemic on the superficiality of traditional values, with 'an attempt to find restraint in an autonomous inner ethic, rather than in an external constraint of public opinion' (Lombard 5).

All the above interpretations, like that of Plutarch followed by Barrett, seem to depend on nice distinctions. It is hard to resist the common-sense view of Solmsen, '...how much better it would be if everybody present at the performance immediately knew what αἰδώς was bad'; or to fail to sympathise with the comment that '[Euripides] had no inkling of the sort of attention which modern scholars expend upon a written text'; or to disagree with Conacher that 'No-one...has given a completely satisfactory account of *aidos* in this passage' (Solmsen 423, Moline 63, Conacher 54). Conacher (54-5) goes some way towards the interpretation here proposed: '...“the bad *aidos*” here regarded as a pleasure refers to the distracting enjoyment of “taboo” subjects which, when not treated with reverence, lead to shame. One such subject particularly relevant to Phaidra's situation is obviously sex'; and he notes the etymological connection between αἰδώς and αἰδοῖα. Conacher does not, however, explain the good αἰδώς, also a pleasure; and he relates the word only to sexual talk, not to sexual activity.

Αἰδώς, commonly translated 'shame', is a complex emotion, focussing essentially on honour, that of oneself or of others, and commonly involving the self consciousness or embarrassment of

<sup>3</sup> Cf. already Dodds 103-4 'each is the victim of his own and the other's submerged desires, masquerading as morality' and now C. Gill, 'The articulation of the self in Euripides' *Hippolytus*' in *Euripides, women and sexuality*, ed. A. Powell (London 1990) 76-107, esp. 80-5; also F.I. Zeitlin, 'The power of Aphrodite' in *Directions in Euripidean criticism*, ed. P. Burian (Durham NC 1985) 52-111 and notes, esp. n. 80. For the underlying importance of marriage, so important in the final aetiology, as a compromise between unremitting chastity and unbridled lust, see A.P. Burnett, 'Hunt and hearth in *Hippolytus*' in *Greek tragedy and its legacy: Essays presented to D.J. Conacher*, edd. M. Cropp, E. Fantham, S.E. Scully (Calgary 1986) 167-85. For other parallelisms, see B.M.W. Knox, 'The *Hippolytus* of Euripides', *YCS* xiii (1952) 3-31, repr. in *Word and action* (Baltimore 1979), and B.D. Frischer, 'Concordia discors and characterization in Euripides' *Hippolytus*', *GRBS* xi (1970) 85-100.

moral inhibition.<sup>4</sup> (Similarly, the verb αἰδέομαι has two related senses: 'respect' and 'feel shame before'.) Such inhibition is peculiarly apt to be present in sexual situations, and it is not surprising that αἰδώς and its opposite ἀναΐδεια (for which, see *Tro.* 1027, *Med.* 472, *Ion* 895) should, like σωφροσύνη and αἰσχύνη, commonly occur in sexual contexts. Indeed, Homer uses αἰδώς for the genitals, αἰδοῖα (*Il.* ii 262 and xxii 75; cf. the archaic English usage 'shame'). Similarly, in the *Anacreontea*, an artist is given very specific instructions on the depiction of the physique of a youthful *hetairios*: ἀπαλῶν δ' ὕπερθε μηρῶν,/ μηρῶν τὸ πῦρ ἐχόντων,/ ἀφελή ποιήσον αἰδῶ/ Παφίτην θέλουσαν ἦδη (17.34-7, J. M. Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus* ii [London 1931] tr. 'make a simple shame that already desires the Paphian'). The notion of sexual allure is conjoined with that of sexual restraint in a Pindaric usage of the word: *P.* 9.12, Aphrodite ἐρατῶν βάλεν αἰδῶ on the first union of Apollo with Kyrene (cf. 41 αἰδέοντ' ἀμφανδον ἀδείας τυχεῖν τὸ πρῶτον εὐνῆς and *P.* 4.218-9). The striking metaphor of the erotic key-holder is found in both *E. Hipp.* (540, Eros) and *Pi. P.* 9 (Peitho, persuasion, a common attendant of Aphrodite). As scholiastic comment indicates that Pindar's source for this myth is the Hesiodic *Eoiai*, there may be common Hesiodic reminiscence in language and mode of expression; as already noted, dual αἰδώς has clear antecedents in Hesiod.

In terms of linguistic usage, αἰδώς may be viewed as the natural reaction to the αἰδοῖα (and, of course, to people who are αἰδοῖοι), just as γελῶς is to γελοῖα. In semantic range, αἰδώς is akin to αἰσχύνη (shame, guilt) and to σωφροσύνη (restraint). That these connotations are close and contemporary may be clearly seen in Euripidean usage. At *IA* 1341-2, where Iphigenia expresses scruples Ἀχιλλεῖα τόνδ' ἰδεῖν αἰσχύνομαι she goes on to explain them τὸ δυστυχεῖς μοι τῶν γάμων αἰδῶ φέρει (cf. also, with reverse order, *Ph.* 1276, where Antigone's words αἰδοῦμεθ' ὄχλον are answered by her mother οὐκ ἐν αἰσχύνῃ τὰ σά). Similarly at *IA* 821-4, Achilles' exclamation ὦ πότνι' αἰδώς meets the response αἰνῶ δ' ὅτι σέβεις τὸ σωφρονεῖν.

The popular equation of αἰδώς with σωφροσύνη and its close connection with αἰσχύνη is evident also in Plato's *Charmides*. In conversation with Sokrates, the young, ingenuous and handsome Charmides suggests, as definitions of σωφροσύνη, first ἡσυχία 'tranquillity', then αἰδώς, and associates the quality of that virtue with feelings of αἰσχύνη: 160e δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι...αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἰσχυντηλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδώς ἢ σωφροσύνη. In *Protagoras*, αἰδώς and δίκη are grandiose equivalents for σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη (with straight substitution 323a).

That αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη are identical in reference is argued by Solmsen with reference to Thucydides (*Th.* i 84.3; see also Lombard 11, n. 28 for interchangeable usage in other authors; and we may here note that αἰσχύνη too might be perceived in relative terms: *Th.* v 111.3 αἰσχύνην...αἰσχύνην αἰσχίω). Solmsen reasons, '...if we find an example of a reprehensible αἰσχύνη, it may throw light on the bad shame in Phaedra's speech...' Because of his view that the discourse is general, he then continues his argument from Thucydides. But we need look no further than Phaedra's speech for bad αἰσχύνη: 408 αἰσχύνειν λέχη, 420-1 μήποτ' ἄνδρα τὸν ἐμὸν αἰσχύνασ' ἄλω /μῆ παιδᾶς οὖς ἔτικτον (and cf. 944 ἤσχυνε τὰμὰ λέκτρα, 1165 κατήσχυν' ἄλοχον, 1172 αἰσχύναντά με). As argued above, the sense here is of sexual shame, specifically the shame of adultery. Similar expressions occur frequently elsewhere, both in verse and prose. Aigisthos is καταίσχυνητής or αἰσχυντήρ (*A. Ag.* 1363, *Ch.* 999; cf. *Ag.* 1626 αἰσχύνειν εὐνήν, also *E. El.* 44). Prose usage indicates that αἰσχύνη words might be substituted, in appropriate contexts, for μοιχεῖα words: see *Arist. Pol.* 1311b7 and, an important

<sup>4</sup> See Douglas Cairns, *Aidos: the psychology and ethics of honour and shame in Greek literature* (Oxford 1992), C.E. Freiherr von Erffa *Aidos und verwandte Begriffe in ihrer Entwicklung von Homer bis Demokrit*, *Philologus* - Suppl. xxx. 2 (Leipzig 1937), and, on the connection of words of \*aizd-root with obscenity, J.J. Henderson, *The maculate muse* (New Haven 1975) 3-5.

text on adultery, *Lys.*i, especially 4 ἐμοίχευεν Ἐρατοσθένης τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν ἐμὴν καὶ ἐκείνην τε διέφθειρε καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἤσχυνε καὶ ἐμὲ αὐτὸν ὕβρισεν..., 32 (a legal echo of the law just read) ἐάν τις ἀνθρώπων ἐλεύθερον ἢ παῖδα αἰσχύνῃ βίᾳ...), and 49 καταίσχυνειν τὰς ἀλλοτρίας γυναῖκας.

The common use of αἰσχύνῃ in the sense of adultery, and its common association with αἰδώς, make Phaidra's prospective reference clear. Of course, strictly speaking there is a distinction between αἰσχύνῃ as sentiment (good, commonly associated with αἰδώς) and αἰσχύνῃ as state of affairs (bad, commonly associated with μοιχεία); but the usage here depends on all the verbal associations of αἰδώς (with αἰδοῖα as well as with both σωφροσύνη and αἰσχύνῃ), and on contextual considerations.

It will be objected that there is no parallel for the use of αἰδώς as a euphemistic metonymy for ἔρω. This interpretation requires that the linguistic associations and semantic nuances of αἰδώς are sufficient to allow the word, in appropriate contexts, to mean 'sex', that (the αἰδοῖα) about which αἰδώς is commonly felt. That this is a reasonable supposition is evident from *Theognidea* 1263-6 ὦ παῖ, ὅς εἰ ἔρδοντα κακὴν ἀπέδωκας ἀμοιβήν,/ οὐδέ τις ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ χάρις παρὰ σοί· οὐδὲν πῶ μ' ὤνησας· ἐγὼ δέ σε πολλάκις ἤδη/ εἰ ἔρδων αἰδοῦς οὐδεμῆς ἔτυχον, cf. 253-4 ὀλίγησ παρὰ σεῦ οὐ τυγχάνω αἰδοῦς and 1331 αἰδέο μ' ὦ παῖ. It is likely that the usage was colloquial. Phaidra's words might be translated 'for shame': delicately, she avoids specific allusion to the sexual feeling which is her dominant concern.

At last we can explain the curious phrase ἄχθος οἴκων. This has a quite specific relevance. Adultery was perceived as a threat to the household because it rendered paternity uncertain, and threatened proper inheritance procedures. For a clear statement of this see *Lys.* i 33 πᾶσαν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις τὴν οἰκίαν γεγονέναι καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἀδήλους εἶναι ὅποτέρων τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ τῶν μοιχῶν. That the 'house' might be put in jeopardy through aberrant sex is evident (cf. *Hipp.* 545-54). And Athenaios (xiii 560c) uses the union of Theseus and Phaidra, with that of Herakles and Iole, to illustrate the statement that ἀνετράπησαν...ὅλοι οἴκοι διὰ γυναῖκας.

The key word of lines 386-7 is καιρός. Phaidra remarks that if the καιρός were clear, two concepts would not be expressed in the same letters. As it is, one type of αἰδώς is in accordance with the καιρός, while the other is not. It is significant that in *WD* 327-9 (ten lines after the αἰδώς passage), the expression παρακαίρια ῥέζω is used of adultery, with the meaning 'out of place'. The negatives of καιρός, variously παρακαίριος (or παράκαιρος), παρὰ καιρόν, ὑπέρκαιριος or ὑπὲρ καιρόν, ἄκαιρος, may be used in a qualitative sense ('out of place') or a quantitative sense ('immoderate'). The latter reflects the original sense of the noun. καιρός in the 5th cent. has a range of meaning reducible to "what is proper, appropriate, just right". This is likely to have developed from something more specific...the noun itself first appears...as the right degree or amount, in opposition (express or implied) to ἄγαν' (Barrett, on 386-7). For the archaic usage, surviving into the fifth century, there are literary as well as philosophical parallels, notably several instances in Pindar: *Pi. O.* 13.47 (in conjunction with μέτρον), *O.* 8.23 (in conjunction with the idea of heavy weights in a balance); cf. *P.* 10.4 and *N.* 1.18 (with reference to the poet's artistic restraint and sensibility).

We have seen that Euripides drew from a long proverbial tradition, rooted in early epic and flourishing in the fifth century, the notion of shades and degrees of αἰδώς. But the treatment of dual αἰδώς has affinities with the interests of sophistic writers also. Reminiscences of Antiphon, and of Sokrates, have already been discussed. The passage shows influence also of the current interest in semantics, practised especially by Prodikos; in determining the precise meaning of words, both by differentiating between near-synonyms and by analyzing the different meanings of a single word. Thus, Prodikos was said to differentiate between pleasures as joy, enjoyment and happiness:...διηρεῖ το τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην (*DK* ii 84 A19). Here, Phaidra protests that one set of letters has two different connotations: cf. *Ph.* 469-72 in

conjunction with 499-502 and 553 (the balanced speeches of Eteokles and Polyneikes in the agon, and the comment of Iokaste as arbitrator) to the effect that the qualities of good, wisdom, and equality are not absolute or uniform, except in names.

There are resonances too with the so-called *Dissoi logoi*, a short sophistic treatise of later date, perhaps around 400 BC, containing ideas plausibly attributed to Protagoras (DK ii 90; see W. K. C. Guthrie, *A history of Greek philosophy* iii [Cambridge 1969] 316-9 for summary and discussion). The word δισσός (and note the repetition, *Hipp.* 928, in the suggestive phrase δισσαὶ φωναί) itself suggests interdependence. (Similar Euripidean expressions, generally in contexts of paradox or debate, and probably with allusive reference to the same ideas, are: *Hel.* 138 δύο...λόγω, *Hec.* 123-4 δισσῶν μύθων, *Alc.* 519 διπλοῦς μῦθος, *Ph.* 469 and *Rh.* 84 ἀπλοῦς μῦθος.) We may compare the content of Phaidra's words with those of the poem quoted *Dissoi logoi* 19, to the effect that nothing is intrinsically good or bad, but good or bad only according to the *καιρός*. The writer sums this up 20, πάντα καιρῷ μὲν καλά...ἐν ἀκαιρίᾳ δ' αἰσχρά. Other Euripidean passages which show affinities with these ideas of Protagoras are: *fr.* 189 Nauck ἐκ παντὸς ἂν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων/ ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἂν, εἰ λέγειν εἶη σοφός and *fr.* 19 τί δ' αἰσχρὸν ἦν μὴ τοῖσι χρωμένοις δοκῆ.

Further, the same terminology of the *καιρός* is used by Demokritos, writing on pleasures. Over-indulgence in pleasures is said to bring a transitory and illusory enjoyment: DK ii 68 B71 ἡδοναὶ ἀκαιροὶ τίκτουσιν ἀηδίας and B235 ὅσοι...ὑπερβεβληκότες τὸν καιρὸν [in pleasures of food, drink, and sex] find their pleasures shortlived:...ἡ τέρψις βραχεῖα. (*Cf.* *E. fr.* 362.3 Nauck βραχεῖα τέρψις ἡδονῆς κακῆς and, expressions based on the idea of the *καιρός*, *Men. Mon.* 217 ἡ γὰρ παράκαιρος ἡδονὴ τίκει βλάβην and 273 καλὸν τὸ καιροῦ παντὸς εἶδέναι μέτρον). In the light of Demokritos' words on excessive or inappropriate pleasures (ἀκαιροὶ, beyond τὸν καιρὸν), and the stance of the writer of the *Dissoi logoi*, Phaidra's expression εἰ ὁ καιρὸς ἦν σαφῆς becomes a highly relevant and meaningful part of her discourse: she counters the view that we must keep indulgence in pleasure to a proper occasion and appropriate level with the objection that this, the *καιρός*, is hard to discern; otherwise the one word αἰδώς would not have its semantic range.

Euripides' two loves are quite different from the two loves differentiated in Plato's *Symposium* (especially 180 d-e and 186a διπλοῦν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα), related to Aphrodite Ourania (metaphysical, idealised) and Aphrodite Pandemos (purely physical, flawed); closer perhaps to Sappho's celebrated description of love as 'bitter-sweet' (40; *cf.* *AP* v 134 and xii 109). Euripides' concern is with love gone wrong, love misdirected, love beyond the bounds of propriety; the ordinary love which is οὐ κακῆ is for tragic choruses, not for tragic heroines. The sentiment that *eros* in excess is to be dreaded, and *eros* in moderation desiderated (*cf.* *Hipp.* 423, 525 *sqq.* argued above to be organically related to Phaidra's speech) is frequently expressed elsewhere by Euripides. In *Medeia*, the chorus sing in the second stasimon that onset of excessive passions (628 ἔρωτες ὑπὲρ μὲν ἄγαν ἐλθόντες) brings neither good repute nor good conduct (οὐκ εὐδοξίαν οὐδ' ἀρετάν), whereas Aphrodite in sufficiency (630 εἰ δ' ἄλις ἔλθοι/ Κύπρις, is the most gracious of gods; they pray never to be target for the ineluctable shafts of love, but protected by chastity (636 στέγοι δέ με σωφροσύνα); they deprecate quarrels and feuds induced by Aphrodite, and hope for peaceful marriage beds (641 ἀπτολέμους εὐνάς; *cf.* *Andr.* 124, 464). Similar ideas are expressed elsewhere: *cf.* *Hel.* 1102-5 τί ποτ' ἀπληστος εἶ κακῶν...; εἰ δ' ἦσθα μετρία...ἡδίστη θεῶν...and *fr.* 967 Nauck εἶης μοι μέτριος δέ πως εἶης μηδ' ἀπολείποις, referred to Aphrodite in Plutarch's citation.

The first stasimon of *Iphigeneia at Aulis* affords a still more direct comparison with *Hippolytos*. The strophe begins by commending the happy situation of those who love in moderation, calmly and chastely (543 *sqq.*...οἶ μετρίας θεοῦ/ μετὰ τε σωφροσύνας μετέ/σχον λέκτρων Ἀφροδίτας,/ γαλανεῖα...). Eros has two kinds of archery (548 δίδυμ' Ἔρωσ...τόξ' ἐντείνεται χαρίτων): one brings happiness, the other destruction (550-1 τὸ μὲν

ἐπ' εὐαίῳνι πότμῳ, / τὸ δ' ἐπὶ συγχύσει βιοτᾶς). The chorus wish for such moderate bliss and sanctioned desires, and to avoid Aphrodite of tremendous passion (557 πολλὰν δ' ἀποθεΐμαν). The antistrophe begins by recognizing the differences between the sexes and their ways (φύσις here being used of the sexes, as is common in Pl. *R.* and elsewhere; see *LSJ*, s.v. VII) and goes on to suggest that both are capable of true good: it is important to pursue virtue, to which schooling is conducive. Wisdom lies in restraint (563 τὸ τε γὰρ αἰδεῖσθαι σοφία) and has the rare grace (564 ἐξαλλάσσοισαν...χάριν) of seeing with judgment (565 ὑπὸ γνώμας) what ought to be done, where reputation brings undying renown to life (566-7 δόξα...βιοτᾶ). It is important to pursue virtue: for women, this lies in discreet loving (568-70 θηρεῦειν ἀρετάν, / γυναιξὶ μὲν κατὰ Κύπριν / κρυπτάν), whereas men's virtue is civic. (The word κρυπτός is common in sexual contexts, usually of infidelity or illicit desire: cf. *Hipp.* 154, 593 and the verb 394; also *Ion* 73 of concealed pregnancy, 1524 of adultery; *Or.* 561 of adultery.) The epode then tells of the judgment of Paris and of the mutual *eros* between him and Helen with its resultant strife, an instance of the destructive side of passion described in the strophe.

Similarly in *Andromache*, Paris is persuaded by the wily words of Aphrodite, which are pleasant but ruinous 289-91 *τερπνοῖς μὲν ἀκούσαι / πικρὰν δὲ σύγχυσιν βίου Φρυγῶν πόλει* (cf. *IA* 551 *ἐπὶ συγχύσει βιοτᾶς*). Fragments from plays about 'bad' women express similar ideas: from *Stheneboia*, that there are two loves, one leading to Hades the other to virtue, *διπλοὶ γὰρ εἶς' ἔρωτες ἔντροφοὶ χθονί, / ὁ μὲν γεγῶς ἔχθιστος εἰς Ἀἴδην φέρει, / ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ σῶφρον τ' ἐπ' ἀρετὴν τ' ἄγων ἔρωτος ζήλωτος ἀνθρώποισιν, ὧν εἶην ἐγώ* (672 Nauck = 16 Page, *Greek literary papyri* i [London 1942]) and from *Melanippe*, that moderation in passion is best, *μετρίων λέκτρων / μετρίων δὲ γάμων / μετὰ σωφροσύνης / κύρσαι θνητοῖσιν ἄριστον* (503 Nauck).

In these passages about good and bad *eros*, there is regularly, as in the case of the double αἰδώς, a strong contrast (μὲν...δέ) sometimes reinforced by words of duality (*IA* δίδυμα τόξα and *Sthen.* διπλοὶ ἔρωτες). The metaphor of love's weapons assailing the victim is recurrent (*Hipp.* 530-2, cf. 392; *IA* 548-9); yet conscious choice is present, notably in the mythical motif of the judgment of Paris. It may be relevant that the metaphor of the bow is central to Herakleitos' discussion of the mean. The same key points recur: moderation, control, judgment, happiness and virtue; excess, helplessness, pleasure, disorder and destruction; life and reputation. They express, with regard to Aphrodite, the commonplace of the desirability of seeking the mean, and avoiding excess. The same sentiment with regard to power or wealth is expressed in the same terms of τὰ μέτρια and καιρός, *Med.* 122-30 and (in a context of true pleasure, including σχολή), *Ion* 621-37.

The question of the dual αἰδώς must be viewed in the context of Phaidra's rhesis, the dramatic momentum of the play, and current intellectual controversy. It has been argued that the passage, viewed as a defence against the imputation of sexual misconduct, is securely embedded in its immediate and wider dramatic context. The central problems are explained: αἰδώς, the culminating item in a sequence of ambivalent feminine pleasures, is erotic pleasure, harmless in its proper place, but harmful when out of its proper place, or out of control. Elsewhere in Euripides *eros* is presented in terms analogous to those here applied, more allusively, to αἰδώς: *more suo*, Euripides startles with an expression which is *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*.

Euripides engages in debate with thinkers of the day. To Prodikos on definitions of words, he responds that value terms have a shifting and elusive meaning. To Demokritos and Protagoras (or the writer of the *Dissoi logoi*) on the nature and proper use of pleasure, he responds that their classification of pleasures cannot be sustained (good and bad depending on circumstances), and that a hedonistic mean cannot be determined (there being no clear determinants). To Antiphon on the nature of the σῶφρον, he responds that self-mastery is not so simple. To Sokrates on the question of human responsibility, he responds that, as we are sometimes unable to carry out what we know to be best, and best for us, some of our actions are beyond our control. These ideas are

allusively, lightly, and almost casually deployed with a deft artistry and a dazzling cleverness wholly subservient to his dramatic purpose. With extreme poignancy, the impossible urgency of Phaidra's passion exemplifies the powerlessness of reason and the ineluctable limitations of the human condition.

Perhaps Euripides reacts, rather than consciously responds, to the contemporaries whose ideas we can trace. These ideas are timeless. The conflict of reason and will (often embracing duty and conscience in pursuance of 'good' and reputable action) against emotion and desire (often embracing pleasure and capitulation in following a 'bad' and disreputable course), in a complex conjunction of cognitive processes and external exigencies, is a matter for philosophical debate, popular remark, and continuing artistic expression. This is not confined to the thought world of the Greeks, such choices being perennial human problems and preoccupations. We may compare one passage which owes something to Euripides' influence, Seneca's *Phaedra* 178-9, 184, *furor cogit sequi lpeiora.../quid ratio possit?* and one modern case, George Eliot's succinct comment on Bulstrode's actions in *Middlemarch*, Penguin ed. 667, 'He was simply a man whose desires had been stronger than his theoretic beliefs'.

We see that αἰσχύνη and σωφροσύνη are linked terms in Greek ethics and in the play. With αἰδώς, which can imply either prospective good σωφροσύνη or retrospective bad αἰσχύνη, chastity and adultery are associatively seen to shade into each other. Through an ambivalent and paradoxical repetition and inversion of words, concepts and images, Euripides demonstrates interlocking patterns between characters and shading of distinctions between concepts. In an artistic representation of Herakleitos' principle of cyclic change, with rest a state of tension between opposing forces, apparent opposites are impressionistically linked: Aphrodite and Artemis, fundamental antinomies, have much in common; Hippolytos and Phaidra, apparently opposed, are in some respects aligned; αἰδώς approximates to ἀνάϊδεια; pleasure involves pain. This is a looking glass world, where nothing is what it seems. If this interpretation of αἰδώς in *Hippolytos* is correct, then a key passage in a much studied play has been fundamentally misunderstood. The implications for the security of our grasp of Greek language, literature and thought are uncomfortable.

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